Editorial by Kuhn, Harold B.
Under the Spell of An Idea
It is scarcely possible to over
estimate the rdle of ideas in the
achievement called History. Against
the view, so popular twenty years ago,
that human events are chiefly the out
come of the operation of economic and
sociological forces, has been placed in
more recent years an emphasis upon
the power of ideas to shape events and
to lend homogeneity to an epoch of
time. In this newer study mistakes
have been made. Some have, under the
spell of modern dynamism, personified
the movement of history and have
sought to understand it in the light of
a deterministic operation of the dia
lectic of ideas. Others have thought
of ideas as genes which impart to
history a particular kind of shape in
advance.
A more moderate view is that,
while ideas do serve to condition
history, ideas are themselves products
of human endeavor, at least in
the sense that they are received,
elaborated or modified and transmitted
to succeeding generations. Thus, while
ideas promote the development of a
culture, they are also influenced by
culture. While there are no 'pure
ideas'�ideas apart from minds which
hold them�neither is there 'pure his
tory.' As Whitehead says.
This notion of historians, of history devoid of
aesthetic prejudice, of history devoid of any
reliance upon metaphysical principles and cos-
mological generalizations, is a figment of
imagination.!
A careful analysis will reveal that
the number of assumptions basic to a
culture is fairly small, and that these
are frequently derived from one
master-generalization, which itself
serves to lend coherence to intellectual
1 Whitehead, Alfred North, Adventures of
Ideas. New York: Macmillan, 1933, p. 4.
life. In seeking to understand the
ideas which have been most power
fully dominant in the shaping of our
modern age, one must bear in mind
that the higher generalizations of a
period are likely to be implicit rather
than explicit. They are most frequent
ly expressed in terms of their
derivatives, these latter serving as a
'front' for the basic generalizations.
It should be remembered that the
vitality of an idea is not dependent
upon its truth or falsity. No one will
deny that the geocentric astronomy
was a powerful intellectual determin
ant in the Middle Ages, though it
later proved to be untenable. Perhaps
the most difficult task for any age is
that of realizing that its basic prin
ciples are in reality assumptions. The
dif&culty here rises from the apparent
tendency of minds to be dazzled by
ideas; or to put it another way, the
mentality of any period is subject to
self-hypnosis, with the result that
enthusiasm for fundamental principles
obscures the power of criticism so
that these principles are accepted as
absolute truths. Only here and there
can be found minds sufficiently frank
and objective to admit that they are
assumptions and subject to either
transformation or abandonment.
The thought world of the eighteenth
century, with its emphasis upon the
order of nature as com])rehended by
reason and as laying a foundation for
natural religion, was radically trans
formed in the nineteenth century.
The early romanticists, while accept
ing the majestic concept of order in
nature, gave to that concept a new
interpretation. During the last quar
ter of the eighteenth century, and the
first half of the nineteenth, there came
into the thinking of the western world
a growing interest in the idea of
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development, not now as a universal
process 'bearing all forward as on a
great wave, but as a temporal, and in
a sense local, forward movement in
which every existing thing has come
to its present state by pursuing its
own laws of development.
We should not imagine that Dar
win's Origin of the Species was the
chief factor in the transition from the
typical eighteenth century mentality
to that of our 'modern' period. In
point of fact, the works of Lessing,
Herder and Hegel in Germany, and
of the Encyclopedists and (later)
Cousin in France, had popularized the
conception of development until the
learned world was so conditioned as
to quickly accept the views of Darwin.
The effect of his work was, it seems,
to convince the scientific world that
whatever difficulties may be found in
proving the how of evolution, the
that of evolution is undeniable. For
eighty years, the generality of scien
tific men have held as a dogma, that
all forms of life have developed from
a few simple forms.
The application of the hypothesis of
evolution has been widespread and
fearless: the principle has been con
scripted to do service in the fields not
only of biology, but of stellar origins,
of psychology, of society and social
configurations, of morals, and of reli
gion. Underlying this manifold use is
a principle really more basic, or at
least more elemental, namely that of
oontinuitp. It is this generalization
which has conditioned the major part
of modern thought.
Implied in the principle of contin
uity is the rejection of all dualisms,
and particularly the rejection of the
dualism of natural and supernatural.
In place of this has been substituted
in modern thought the monistic view
of the world as externalizing one
cosmic principle. God, man, and
nature thus meet on common ground :
all are parts of a growing whole.
Within this scheme, the process of
development appeared to some as the
supreme expression of the divine life.
When the explanations offered by
Lamarck, Darwin, and De Vries were
successively weighed and found want
ing, at least two alternatives were
open to twentieth-century thinkers:
they might begin to question the
validity of the principle of continuity
itself; or they might continue to hold
the principle as truth, and seek some
other mode of explanation. That the
latter alternative has been generally
chosen few will deny. The charm of
the idea of continuity for the modern
mind has been great. Under its sway
one of the men considered to possess
a mind as keen as any in our genera
tion writes:
For example, at a remote period urged by the
growth of forests some mammals ascended trees
and became apes ; and then later, after the lapse
of some vast period, urged by the decay of for
ests, the same race descended from trees and
became men.2
This does not mean that the think
ers who dogmatically accept the
evolutionary hypothesis are content to
remain without a rationale for their
belief. The latest attempt at explana
tion is that known as 'creative' or
'emergent' evolution, a metaphysical
theory whose assumptions are quite
other than the empiricism of which
science boasts. Carl F. H. Henry
comments as follows:
Modern science first revolted against theistic
creationism because of its supposed "non-scientific"
character. But now science has reacted to the
inability of Darwinian evolution to produce miss
ing links, by the proclamation of a speculative
theory of reality whose pivot points are rooted
not in science but in philosophy.3
Perhaps sufficient has been said
concerning the power of the conception
of continuity in general to indicate
that it exercises a two-fold tyranny in
2 Whitehead: op. cit., p. 8.
3 Remaking the Modern Mind. Grand Rapids:
Eerdman's, 1946. p. 118.
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our modern day. It has so captured the
fancy of the scholarly world that no
paucity of evidence in its support can
bring the modern mind to treat it
skeptically- And, it has succeeded in
forcing its canons upon all branches
of scholarly investigation until it may
fairly be said to be the predominant
motif in the typically modern way of
thinking.
In few fields of scholarship has the
application of the generalization of
continuity been more fearlessly applied
than in the field of religion. It is not
the purpose of this editorial to trace
the implications of this principle for
the historic Christian doctrines of
creation, revelation, human nature,
and redemption, and for the Christian
eschatology. A little reflection will
reveal that the searching application
of the evolutionary hypothesis will
necessitate not only a radical trans
formation of the character of the
historic Christian system, but a denial
of its qualitative superiority over the
other religious systems of men.
It is significant that in this very
field in which the principle of con
tinuity has for nearly a century been
embraced with such enthusiasm, there
are indications of some searching of
heart. By the kind consent of Dr.
Robert H. Pfeiffer, editor of the Jour
nal of Biblioal Literature, we are
reprinting a book review, written by
Dr. Walther Eichrodt, Professor of
Old Testament in the University of
Basel. The editor of The Ashuri/ Sem
inarian is very grateful to his former
teacher for this permission, which
allows us to bring to our readers a
stimulating and scholarly expression
of the newer temper.
�H. B. K.
